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Abstract 
This paper benefits from various risk- and non-risk-based regulatory capital ratios and 
examines their impact on bank risk and performance in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region. Our findings suggest that compliance with Basel capital requirements 
enhances bank protection against risk, and improves efficiency and profitability. The impact 
of capital requirements on bank performance is more pronounced for too-big-to-fail banks, 
banks in periods of crises and banks in countries with good governance. The results are also 
robust when controlling for the Arab Spring transition period. Finally, endogeneity checks, 
alternative risk and performance measures, a principal component analysis and other 
estimation techniques confirm findings. 
JEL classification: G21, G28, G32, P5. 
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1. Introduction 
Investigations into whether bank capital has a positive or negative effect on bank risk 
and performance proliferated after the 2007/2008 subprime crisis. Existing empirical work 
mainly focuses on the association between capital, risk and profitability in American and 
European contexts (Altunbas et al., 2007; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013). However, recent 
research brings novel insights into banks in alternative regions or countries: the Asian (Lee 
and Hsieh (2013)), the Sub-Saharan African (Flamini et al., 2009), the Middle Eastern and 
North African (MENA) regions (Ben Naceur and Omran, 2011), and banks in Egypt (Ben 
Naceur and Goaied, 2008) and Tunisia (Ben Naceur and Kandil, 2009). Despite the ongoing 
debate on the importance of financial reforms, there are no empirical studies that examine the 
impact of banking regulation (in particular, capital requirements in light of the Basel accords) 
on the risk and the performance of banks in the MENA region. Accordingly, this paper 
examines the impact of Basel capital requirements on risk and bank performance (namely 
efficiency and profitability) for a sample of 168 banks in 17 Middle Eastern and North 
African countries for the 1999–2013 period. 
Our study differs because we extend the analysis to examine the effect of bank capital 
on risk, efficiency and profitability using risk-based regulatory ratios and non-risk-based 
traditional capital ratios. Evidence of the impact of Basel capital requirements (namely, Tier 1 
capital, Tier 2 capital and total capital ratio) on bank risk and performance in the MENA 
region is scarce. In addition, as far as we know, no existing studies have employed both the 
Basel risk-based capital ratios and the traditional non-risk-based capital ratios (such as 
common equity and tangible equity) to investigate their impact on both bank risk and 
performance.  
We investigate the MENA countries for several reasons. First of all, the credit growth in 
the MENA region has been more moderate, less volatile and less risky. However, more 
recently, MENA countries have experienced rapid and more volatile credit growth rates, 
which may raise concerns about the stability of the financial system, and especially that 
higher credit growth is often followed by financial crisis (Crowley, 2008). Second, the MENA 
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region contains four of the most essential and international trade canals or checkpoints (Suez, 
Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb and Gibraltar). Third, as a bridge between developed and 
developing countries in Europe, Asia and Africa, the MENA region attracts investors and 
bankers worldwide. This strategic position makes the MENA countries more susceptible to 
political instability and thus economic and financial vulnerability. In addition, the region is 
facing numerous changes such as the opening up of certain markets to foreign competition, 
the expansion of the private sector and the increased role of bank lending. In practice, several 
countries in the MENA region have adopted financial reforms since the late 1990s for the 
purpose of ensuring efficiency in allocating bank resources and enhancing productivity. Yet, 
this region is still ranked far behind the industrialized countries (Creane et al., 2004). 
Therefore there is a need to strengthen banking supervision and regulation by conforming to 
international Basel standards, especially the capital requirements.  
We find that higher risk- and non-risk-based capital ratios are positively associated with 
bank loan loss reserve ratios, bank efficiency and profitability, consistent with the 
recommendations of the Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision (BCBS) regarding the 
importance of holding higher capital ratios. Our results also show that banks in the MENA 
region are less capable of dealing with capital-like ratios (that is, Tier 2 ratios) than those in 
GCC countries. In particular, the latter benefit from the oil boom, expertise and connections 
with many Western banks operating in the Gulf region. Accordingly, banks are encouraged to 
increase the Tier 1 element in their capital adequacy ratios rather than the Tier 2 element. 
Moreover, the impact of capital requirements on bank efficiency and profitability is more 
effective for too-big-to-fail banks, banks in countries with a good governance policy and 
banks during the Arab Spring political transition period. In addition, we find differences in the 
effect of capital ratios when comparing banks in GCC countries with banks in the rest of the 
MENA region and banks during crisis with banks during normal times, especially for capital-
like ratios. This provides additional support to the importance of capital guidelines and good 
governance in preventing financial instability in periods of political transition and financial 
distress. Finally, an instrumental variables approach, alternative risk and performance 
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measures, a principal component analysis and other estimation techniques validate our 
findings. 
Our research contributes to the existing literature in several ways. For the first time, we 
examine the impact of the Basel guidelines – in terms of risk- and non-risk-based regulatory 
capital requirements – on the risk, efficiency and profitability of commercial banks in the 
MENA region. Also, our study is different because we use eight capital ratios and combine 
risk-based capital measures with non-risk-based capital measures to compare and examine 
whether the Basel Accords have a pronounced effect on the bank risk and performance of a 
large sample of commercial banks in the MENA region. We use risk- and non-risk-based 
capital ratios because of the renewed debate on the effectiveness of capital requirements. For 
instance, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) and Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) ask what kind 
of capital banks need to use and how to structure it. This is consistent with Haldane (2012), 
Dermine (2015) and Cathcart et al. (2015) who shed doubts on the ability of risk-weighted 
assets to reflect actual bank risk exposure, especially during the subprime crisis. This paper 
adds to the literature on the effectiveness of capital requirements (Basel risk-based capital 
ratios versus traditional non-risk-based capital ratios) by examining the banks in the MENA 
region. In the additional subsample comparison analyses between Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries and the remaining MENA countries, we study the impact of the Arab Spring 
transition period on the linkage between capital, risk and bank performance in both regions. 
Furthermore, we not only consider the traditional relationship between capital and risk but 
also extend our study to examine banking efficiency and profitability. Finally, we utilize 
several regression techniques and combine parametric approaches (OLS regressions, 2SLS, 
LIML, GMM) and nonparametric approaches (principal component analysis and quantile 
regressions) to examine the robustness of our results.  
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 establishes the theoretical and empirical 
frameworks by examining the relationships between bank capital, risk and performance. 
Section 3 describes the data and summarizes the variables’ characteristics. Section 4 reports 
and discusses the empirical results. The last section discusses the paper’s limitations and 
implications for regulators and policymakers in the MENA region. 
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2. Literature review  
VanHoose (2007) provides an extensive literature review of the impact of capital 
requirements on the stability (risk) of the banking system. However, only a limited number of 
studies extend this association to examine bank efficiency and profitability for the European 
context (Altunbas et al., 2007) and for the Asian context (Lee and Hsieh, 2013). In contrast to 
most previous research, our study uses various types of capital to examine, for the first time, 
their effect on the risk, efficiency and profitability of banks in the MENA region. Below is a 
review of the literature on bank capital, risk, efficiency and profitability.  
2.1. Risk and capital requirements 
Lee and Hsieh (2013) argue that the relationship between capital and risk can be 
explained by using the regulatory and moral hazard paradigms. They refer to the moral hazard 
hypothesis, in which capital has a negative impact on bank risk, and to the regulatory 
hypothesis, in which capital and risk are positively associated.  
Generally, unregulated banks tend to take excessive risks to maximize the shareholder 
value at the expense of the depositors. In fact, the reason behind this is that if high-risk loans 
do not pay off, depositors’ money is protected by deposit insurance (Furlong and Keeley, 
1989; Keeley and Furlong, 1991). In addition, the depositors lose interest in supervising the 
bank’s investments because their money is guaranteed (Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane, 2001). As 
a result, deposit insurance is no longer effective in preventing bank runs2 (Bryant, 1980; 
Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Paradoxically, this situation creates incentives for managers to 
take on more risk. To prevent this pattern of moral hazard and to support financial regulation 
theory, a capital risk plan must be integrated (Kim and Santomero, 1988). This plan refers to a 
positive relationship between capital and risk, meaning that supervisory authorities encourage 
banks to increase their capital commensurably with the amount of risk taken (Iannotta, 2006; 
Altunbas et al., 2007; Iannotta et al., 2007). As a result, banks will be more prudent with their 
choice of riskier activities to avoid costly increases in their capital ratio. Thus, the objective of 
                                                          
2 Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2001) explain that to make deposit insurance a safety net for small depositors and a 
good way of reducing concerns about the stability of small banks, the supervisory authorities must be active and 
efficient.  
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the capital adequacy ratio is to force banks to internalize their losses and decrease the moral 
hazard (Rime, 2001), namely by forcing the bank shareholders to absorb a large part of the 
losses (Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2014). Consequently, the quality of assets and off-
balance sheet risk exposure will be integrated into the bank capital requirement, thereby 
strengthening the stability of the banking system (Barrios and Blanco, 2003; Vazquez and 
Federico, 2015). 
Alternatively, some authors argue that there is a negative relationship between capital 
and risk (Jahankhani and Lynge, 1980; Brewer and Lee, 1986; Jacques and Nigro, 1997; 
Agusman et al., 2008). Berger and Bouwman (2013) examine US banks and find that capital 
has a positive impact on small banks’ probability of survival during crisis periods. Anginer 
and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) find a negative association between capital measures and several 
indicators of bank risk when examining an international sample. The same results are 
obtained by Klomp and de Haan (2014) when examining a sample of banks in 70 developing 
and emerging countries and Lee and Hsieh (2013) when studying banks in 42 Asian countries. 
Employing a legal quality index, Neyapti and Nergiz Deincer (2014) show that bank 
regulation and supervision – including capital requirements – reduce bank non-performing 
loans and help achieve a sustainable and efficient resource allocation of bank depositors’ 
savings into investments.  
While the literature shows mixed results regarding the association between capital and 
risk, a new stream of research indicates that capital requirements (especially the Basel risk-
weighted assets capital ratio) have no significant impact on bank risk (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2011; Arnold et al., 2012; Haldane, 2012). This was reflected in the subprime 
crisis and raised doubts about the effectiveness of the risk-weighting methodology. Cathcart et 
al. (2015) report that the top 25 banks in the United States and Europe had Tier 1 capital ratios 
of 8.3% and 8.1%, which are much higher than the 4% of regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio 
required by the BCBS. However, despite the high level of solvency ratios, these banks were 
not able to absorb their risk exposure and prevent systemic risk. Arnold et al. (2012) argue 
that regulators need to distinguish between capital of good quality (for example, the common 
equity Tier 1 capital ratio) and capital-like ratios (for example, debt ratios or Tier 2 capital 
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ratio). They explain that while more capital is good, it is important to understand that some 
capital is better than other capital. In the same context, Dermine (2015) criticizes the Basel 
II/III capital ratio and focuses on capital’s denominator risk-weighting methodology. The 
study shows that the only way to prevent any untruthful bank risk exposure is to create a 
complementary non-risk-based leverage ratio that serves in addition to the capital regulatory 
ratio (Blum, 2008; Arnold et al., 2012; Haldane, 2012). The BCBS adopted this concept in 
2014 (BCBS, 2014) and public disclosure of the leverage ratio was available from January 1, 
2015.  
2.2. Efficiency, profitability and capital requirements  
Lee and Hsieh (2013) find that the association between capital and risk depends on the 
level of bank profitability. The two authors examine a sample of Asian banks and find that 
capital has a positive effect on bank profitability but a negative effect on bank risk. Altunbas 
et al. (2007) study the European banking system and find a positive association between 
capital and risk, and a negative association between capital and efficiency. These two studies 
are examples of the mixed literature about the relationship between capital requirements and 
bank risk and performance (profitability and efficiency). 
Examining a sample of 181 large banks from 15 European countries, Iannotta et al. 
(2007) find a positive and significant association between capital and two indicators of bank 
profitability and a negative and significant association between capital and bank cost. The 
authors offer three explanations for their results. First, higher bank capitalization may be 
reflected in higher management quality and thus higher income and lower cost, which 
generate more bank profits. Second, capitalized banks are most likely to have lower 
bankruptcy costs, which in turn reduce funding costs, thereby generating higher income. 
Berger (1995) reaches a similar conclusion. Employing a Granger causality test, the author 
studies the causality relationship between capital and earnings measured by return on equity. 
His results suggest a positive effect of capital on bank earnings. Berger’s results and 
explanations are in line with those of Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000), who also find a 
positive association between equity-to-assets and bank profits when examining a sample of 
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banks in 44 developed and developing countries. Finally, Iannotta (2006) argues that 
according to the Basel guidelines, banks are required to increase their capital ratios 
commensurably with the amount of risk taken. Higher capital ratios diminish banks’ leverage 
behavior and thus their expected returns. Fiordelisi et al. (2011) explain that lower returns 
induce bank owners to choose a higher point on the efficiency frontier to improve their 
profits. This leads to investments in riskier portfolios. As a consequence, a positive effect 
should be expected between capital and profits.  
Working in the same context, Chortareasa et al. (2012) find that capital requirements 
have a positive effect on efficiency and a negative effect on bank costs when using an 
unbalanced panel of 5,227 bank-year observations in 22 European Union countries. The 
authors suggest that a higher level of capitalization reduces agency problems between 
managers and shareholders. Accordingly, the latter will have greater incentives to monitor 
management performance and ensure that the bank is efficient.  
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) find that capital requirements had a positive influence on 
bank stock market returns in the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Their results are even stronger 
with larger banks. Accordingly, they support the hypothesis that higher capital ratios – 
especially capital of good quality, such as Tier 1 capital or common equity – strengthen bank 
performance.  
With regard to efficiency, the literature offers two types of measures: accounting ratios 
(such as cost-to-income ratio, net interest margin, operating income and profits) and 
efficiency scores computed using nonparametric approaches3 such as Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA). Below, we document the main references for the efficiency score literature. 
Pasiouras (2008) investigates the impact of the regulation and supervision 
recommended by Basel II on bank efficiency and finds that efficiency scores increase with 
bank capitalization. Staub et al. (2010) test a moral hazard hypothesis and find that when 
                                                          
3 Berger (1997, 2007) offers an extensive literature review on studies that use parametric and nonparametric 
approaches. The efficiency scores can be estimated using other nonparametric approaches such as the Free 
Disposal Hull (FDH). In addition to nonparametric approaches, efficiency scores can be computed using 
parametric approaches such as the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), the distribution-free approach (DFA) and 
the thick frontier approach (TFA).  
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banks hold more capital they are more cautious in terms of their risk behavior, which can be 
channeled into higher efficiency scores. Banker et al. (2010) show that the capital ratio is 
positively correlated with several types of bank efficiency (aggregate efficiency, technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency) when studying the efficiency scores of 14 Korean banks 
for the period 1995–2005. Sufian (2010) also highlights the important role of capital 
requirements in strengthening the capacity of financial institutions in the Chinese banking 
sector to withstand financial crises. Finally, Barth et al. (2013) study the relationship between 
banking regulations and efficiency. Their results suggest that capital stringency and equity-to-
asset ratios are positively associated with bank efficiency.  
In this study, we benefit from the work of Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) and 
explore whether different types (definitions) of capital ratios have the same impact not only 
on bank risk but also on bank efficiency and profitability. 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Sample 
We use Bankscope as our primary source of data for this study (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
2013; Lee and Hsieh, 2013; Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2014). For each bank in the sample, 
we retrieve annual data from 1999 to 2013. The sample includes 168 banks from 17 MENA 
countries4 (including six GCC countries). A bank is excluded from the sample if it does not 
have at least two continuous observations. In addition, we remove countries that have data for 
fewer than four banks.5 We finally note that our study tests and the significance of the results 
are limited by data availability.  
3.2. Measures of risk, efficiency and profitability  
The main objective of this paper is to examine the impact of various definitions of 
capital on bank risk and performance. We measure risk using the loan loss reserves to gross 
                                                          
4 Specifically, our sample covers the following countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Mauritania, Oman, the Palestinian territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the UAE and 
Yemen. 
5 We exclude Israel from the sample because it is considered to be a developed country.  
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loans (LLRGLP).6 This ratio measures loan quality (Altunbas et al., 2007; Abedifar et al., 
2013; Lee and Hsieh, 2013), with higher values indicating poorer loan quality or higher 
protection against credit default risk. For the robustness tests, we use nonperforming loans to 
gross loans (NPLGLP).  
We measure performance using the bank cost-to-income ratio (CIRP). This ratio is used 
to control for any cross-bank differences in terms of efficiency; a higher value indicates a 
lower level of efficiency. In addition, we employ net income to total assets (EARTAP) as a 
measure of bank profitability (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013; Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt, 
2014). For the robustness checks, we include the ratio of net interest margin (NIMP) and net 
income to gross loans (EARGLP). The former is computed as the bank [interest income–
interest expenses] divided by the total earning assets (Chortareasa et al., 2012). The latter is 
another measure of bank profitability and performance.  
3.3. Measures of capital and control variables 
We follow the work of Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) and Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt 
(2014) and use several definitions of capital requirements. These measures are computed 
according to the Basel rule by using risk-weighted assets (rwa) in the first step. Then, in the 
second step, we compute the same ratios but we use total assets (ta) instead. The objective of 
such a comparison is to avoid any untruthful assessment related to the calculation of risk-
weighted assets (Arnold et al., 2012; Cathcart et al., 2015; Dermine, 2015). The first vector 
employs three ratios: Tier 1 (tier 1/rwa), Tier 2 (tier 2/rwa) and Tier 1 plus Tier 2 divided by 
risk-weighted assets and off-balance sheet exposures (total capital/rwa). Tier 1 capital is the 
sum of shareholders’ funds and perpetual, noncumulative preference shares. Tier 2 capital is 
the sum of hybrid capital, subordinated debt, loan loss reserves and valuation reserves. Total 
capital, known as the capital adequacy ratio numerator, contains in addition to Tier 1 a 
                                                          
6 We focus on credit risk for several reasons: First, credit risk is considered the most important type of risk a 
banking institution could face. It also constitutes, along with operational risk and market risk, the first pillar of 
Basel II. Second, due to limited data availability, we did not include market-based indicators such as the distance 
to default or other complex risk measures. Finally, stability indicators such as the Z-score cannot be used as a 
dependent variable because the Z-score already includes a capital measure, which could influence our regression 
results.    
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proportion of Tier 2 capital. This ratio must be at least 8% under the Basel II rules. Bank 
common equity includes common shares, retained earnings, reserves for general banking risks 
and statutory reserves. Tangible common equity removes goodwill and any other intangible 
assets from its equity.  
We also employ a series of bank-level control variables to capture the differences in 
bank characteristics. We first include the net loans to total assets (net loans/ta) as the literature 
shows that banks that possess an important loan portfolio are less exposed to risk than other 
banks that prefer to invest in derivatives, other types of securities and other nontraditional 
activities. Second, we use growth of total assets (growth assets) to control for the evolution of 
the bank’s total assets for the current year compared with the previous year. Abedifar et al. 
(2013) qualifies this ratio as a proxy for bank growth and development strategy. Third, we 
check for diversification using the income diversity ratio (income diversity). This captures the 
degree to which banks diversify between lending and non-lending activities. Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2010) and Baele et al. (2007) find that greater reliance on noninterest income is 
linked to more volatile returns. Stiroh (2004) finds a negative association between total bank 
risk and diversification of revenue. We follow Laeven and Levine (2007) and compute 
income diversity as 1–[(net interest income–other operating income)/(operating income)]. On 
average, income diversity takes values between 0 and 1. The higher the value, the more 
activities are diversified. To control for risk and efficiency, we use the cost-to-income ratio in 
the risk model and loan loss reserves to total assets in the efficiency and profitability models. 
Finally, we use the natural logarithm of total assets to control for bank size (size). All the 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the effect of outliers. The 
variable definitions and sources are explained in Appendix A.1. 
4. Empirical results 
In this section, we present the variables’ descriptive statistics, main results and several 
other robustness techniques.  
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4.1. Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of banks’ variables of interest (namely, 
endogenous and exogenous) and control variables.7 The number of observations varies 
dramatically between risk-based capital measures and non-risk-based capital measures. For 
instance, Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets (Tier 1/rwa) has 1054 observations with a 
median of 15.27%, which is, surprisingly, far above the minimum capital requirement of 4% 
proposed by the BCBS. However, non-risk-based measures have more than twice as many 
observations. For example, tangible common equity to tangible assets has a total of 2515 
observations with a median value of 11.33%. The number of missing observations can be 
explained by the fact that most countries started reporting their capital requirements 
information in 2006 or that some banks prefer not to provide information about their capital 
adequacy ratios and would rather provide information about their traditional capital ratios. 
These countries might still be working under the Basel I accord or prefer not to disclose 
information about their risk weighting, and thus their assets’ risk exposure. 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
4.2. Main results  
We use the following OLS regression model to examine the relationship between 
capital, risk and bank performance: 
f(LLRGLP, CIRP, EARTAP)ijt = α + φ × bank_controlijt + β × Capital_raijt + 𝜀ijt       (1) 
The dependent variables are banks’ LLRGLP, CIRP and EARTAP in country j in year t, 
as defined in the previous section. The main independent variables are the capital ratios, as 
                                                          
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for comments on the negative minimum value of net interest margin and small 
values of Tier 2 capital. The negative value of net interest margin indicates that in some cases bank interest 
expenses exceed interest income, suggesting a bad financial decision where the bank’s performance might be at 
risk. An example of negative values of net interest margin can be found in previous works such as Abedifar et al. 
(2013). The small-value Tier 2 capital means that the bank is avoiding the usage of hybrid capital and the 
instruments of subordinated debt. As a complementary element, Basel III requires banks to reduce the value of 
Tier 2 and improve the value of Tier 1 because Tier 1 represents capital of a good quality. Examples of negative 
or null values of Tier 2 are reported in papers such as Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) and Anginer and Demirgüç-
Kunt (2014).  
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expressed in the previous section.8 The bank-level control variables incorporate bank size, 
bank loan engagement, growth of total assets, income diversity ratio and bank cost or risk, 
depending on the equation.9  
The results of Eq. (1) are presented in Table 2 and show a positive and significant 
association between capital and risk in five out of eight definitions of capital ratios (Models 2 
to 6). The results clearly show that banks with higher capital ratios have higher loan loss 
reserves to be commensurate with the amount of risk taken, thereby giving support to the role 
of the Basel Accords (Altunbas et al., 2007; Iannotta et al., 2007). According to Arnold et al. 
(2012), three lessons are learned from the establishment of a regulatory capital ratio: (i) more 
capital is important; (ii) capital ratios should be based on some measures of risk; and (iii) 
some capital is better than other capital. Our results clearly show that higher levels of 
capitalization compensate for riskier assets (Iannotta et al., 2007). 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Table 3 and Table 4 report a negative and significant impact of capital on bank 
inefficiency (all the models except Models 2 and 5) and a positive and significant effect on 
bank profitability (all the models except Model 5). Therefore, higher capital ratios ameliorate 
bank efficiency and profitability. Our results are similar to those obtained in the literature 
(Iannotta et al., 2007; Pasiouras, 2008; Ben Naceur and Omran, 2011; Chorterareas et al., 
2012; Barth et al., 2013; Lee and Hsieh, 2013). These authors explain that higher capital 
requirements help to discipline banks’ activities and increase supervision and monitoring and 
therefore bank efficiency and profitability. Finally, we find that other forms of capital or 
capital-like instruments of debt (Tier 2) do not show any significant impact on bank efficiency 
and profitability; rather, the association becomes negative and significant in Table 4 Model 2. 
Arnold et al. (2012) explain that the greater creativity in the capital markets gave birth to new 
                                                          
8 Except for the capital ratios, all the correlation coefficients are below 0.4. Therefore, we run each model using 
only one measure of capital to avoid multicollinearity. The Pearson correlation matrix is available from the authors 
upon request.  
9 We follow the work of Beck et al. (2013) and Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) and cluster on the bank level 
instead of the country level for two reasons. First, some countries have significant numbers of observations 
compared with other countries in the sample. Second, we only have 17 countries. Therefore, clustering at the 
country level might create biased results.  
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forms of capital (or capital/debt-like) that can be considered in the capital/risk formula. 
However, the severe impact of the subprime crisis demonstrated that “some capital is better 
than other capital” (Arnold et al., 2012, p. 3131). Therefore, an emerging literature is showing 
that imposing complex regulatory requirements that use risk-weighted assets and combine 
debt instruments with capital of good quality could make banks even riskier than before 
(Cathcart et al., 2015; Dermine, 2015; Haldane, 2012). Dermine (2015) puts forward five 
reasons for criticizing Pillar 1 risk-weighted assets and the Basel II/III capital ratio (p. 266): 
“(i) insufficient capital in a recession, (ii) complexity, (iii) openness to gaming, (iv) lack of 
robustness, and (v) fear of excessive leverage.” One solution is that a complex capital 
measure should be followed by a non-risk-based leverage ratio (Blum, 2008; Cathcart, 2015; 
Dermine, 2015), such as Tier 1 to unweighted assets, as required in the Basel III framework. 
This helps to avoid any inaccurate assessment in quantifying risk.  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
With respect to our control variables, we find that larger banks are less risky, more 
profitable and more efficient because they benefit from economies of scale and a good risk 
management and monitoring policy. Growth of total assets is positively associated with bank 
profits and negatively associated with bank risk. Thus, year-to-year growth in total assets 
helps banks to benefit from their expansion strategies to invest more in risk management and 
credit monitoring, which could decrease any potential credit default and thus ameliorate bank 
profits. Higher proportions of net loans in bank total assets reduce bank risk and ameliorate 
bank efficiency and profits. Accordingly, a higher level of engagement in traditional banking 
activities, such as loans, requires fewer reserves to protect against credit default than other 
nontraditional banking activities. It appears that banks in the MENA region rely more on 
traditional activities10 (PWC, 2014), making them more cost-efficient, which can be translated 
                                                          
10 Khasawneh and Hassan (2008) explain that regulatory pressure and constraints, in addition to political, economic 
and technological deficiencies in MENA countries, prevent the banking system from using financial innovation 
and other types of nontraditional activities. Another reason that could make MENA banks more vigilant in using 
financial derivatives is the number of bankrupted banks during the 2007/2008 financial crisis due to the over usage 
of nontraditional activities such as derivatives and other toxic financial products. Finally, the financial markets in 
the MENA region are less efficient and immature, which reduces opportunities to invest in new and complex 
nontraditional financial products.  
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into higher profitability ratios. The income diversity ratio increases bank risk but reduces 
bank inefficiency and ameliorates bank profits. Unlike loans to assets, a higher ratio means 
diversification towards nontraditional activities. This could explain the positive association 
with bank risk whereby banks in the MENA region anticipate higher default risk as they move 
towards nontraditional activities. However, as with the loans-to-assets ratio, greater 
diversification ameliorates bank profits and efficiency. Finally, we find no evidence of a 
significant association between the loan loss reserves ratio and the bank cost-to-income ratio. 
We also find that the loan loss reserves and profitability ratios are negatively associated.  
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
4.3. Robustness tests: bank size, too-big-to-fail, liquidity, the financial crisis and other tests 
We follow the work of Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) to examine any cross-
sectional heterogeneity in the association between capital, risk and bank performance.11 
Accordingly, we examine whether our results hold for too-big-to-fail banks (tbtfa), highly 
liquid banks (h_liquid), banks in GCC countries (GCC_dum) versus banks in non-GCC 
countries (NGCC_dum), banks during the subprime crisis period (crisis) versus banks during 
normal times (normal) and finally the impact of the world governance indicator (world_gov) 
on banks in GCC countries vs. non-GCC countries. 
Table 5 reports the results for too-big-to-fail banks using the following OLS regression: 
f(LLRGLP, CIRP, EARTAP)ijt = α + φ × bank_controlijt + 𝛽1 × Capital_raijt 
+β2 × Capital_raijt × size (or tbtfa) + εijt                                          (2)                  
Here, we can argue from two interconnected perspectives. The first posits that being a 
too-big-to-fail bank makes the effect of capital requirements on bank risk and performance 
less important. The second perspective focuses on the fact that larger banks exist in several 
markets in different countries, engage in nontraditional activities and tend to have higher 
                                                          
11 Our sample is dominated by Lebanese and Egyptian banks. To avoid any biased results, we dropped both 
countries from the sample to examine the robustness of our results. Our findings, however, are not sensitive to 
this. 
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profits and thus higher retained earnings in their capital buffer. Higher capital requirements 
can also reduce agency cost between bank owners and depositors, resulting in better 
performance. We interact capital ratios with bank size (size) (Panel A) and the too-big-to-fail 
dummy12 (tbtfa) (Panel B) to examine whether the results persist for large banks. Our findings 
suggest that a higher level of capital is less effective in requiring bigger banks to adjust their 
loan loss reserves according to the Basel methodology. However, Table 5 Panel A and Panel 
B show that larger banks with higher capital ratios are more cost-efficient and more 
profitable. Our results are consistent with Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) for the 
association between capital and risk. If larger banks benefit from implicit too-big-too-fail 
guarantees and governmental bailouts, then they will be less interested in holding higher 
capital ratios. Finally, the positive effect of capital on the performance of large banks suggests 
that capital ratios are more effective in reducing costs. Capital also plays a key role as a signal 
of bank asset quality and thus its performance (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013). 
 [Insert Table 5 around here] 
Besides capital of good quality and additional capital buffers, Basel III introduces a new 
framework for liquidity risk that “establishes minimum levels of liquidity for internationally 
active banks” (Arnold et al., 2012). Therefore, we control for liquidity and interact the capital 
ratios with a dummy variable (h_liquid) to determine whether the results hold for highly 
liquid banks.13 We also use Eq. (2) and replace size with h_liquid. Table 6 Panel A shows that 
the effect of capital ratios on risk is more pronounced for highly liquid banks, while the 
results are not significantly different for the efficiency and profitability models. Therefore, 
more liquid banks have a more effective policy in protecting against risk and this could be 
achieved by holding higher loan loss reserve ratios. As for efficiency and profitability, the 
interaction terms suggest that increased capital ratios for highly liquid banks did not penalize 
their performance. Perhaps this reflects the fact that banks in the MENA region prefer to hold 
liquid assets in the form of governmental and Central Banks bonds instead of long term risky 
investments, as well as liquid assets in the form of mortgage backed securities. This is due to 
                                                          
12 Based on the upper quantile (Q75), banks are classified as too-big-to-fail when LnTA>15.827. 
13 Based on the upper quantile (Q75), banks are classified as highly liquid when liquid assets to assets >43.922. 
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MENA’s underdeveloped financial markets and lack of expertise in evaluating complex 
financial instruments. For instance, the usage of financial derivatives was the main reason 
behind the deterioration of asset quality that made many western banks illiquid, and 
negatively affected their performance once the subprime crisis emerged (Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al., 2013). 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
To investigate whether our results are the same for GCC14 and non-GCC countries, we 
create two separate dummy variables that represent GCC countries and the rest of the MENA 
countries. Then, we interact both of them with our capital ratios. The results are reported in 
Table 6 Panel B and suggest no significant difference between the two regions. However, it is 
interesting to note that the Tier 2 ratios (risk-weighted and non-risk-weighted) show different 
impacts on the two regions. We find that higher Tier 2 ratios have a positive and marginal 
impact on loan loss reserves but reduce bank efficiency and profitability in the non-GCC 
countries. This could be explained by the fact that banks in GCC countries are more 
experienced with capital-like instruments than banks in the rest of the MENA countries. 
Benefiting from the oil boom,15 banks in the GCC region attract talented managers, along 
with skilled and competent employees. They also benefit from connections and the expertise 
of many Western banks operating in the Gulf region. In addition, GCC governments are 
working on developing their own regulatory framework (Ben Naceur and Omran, 2011). By 
adhering to the Basel III capital framework, GCC banks are strengthening the capacity of their 
banking system to absorb financial shocks, enhance risk management and improve 
transparency. Eventually, this can be reflected in a better understanding of hybrid capital and 
financial instruments that can be integrated into the capital-like element of the capital 
measure.  
                                                          
14 The GCC countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. To 
separate the GCC countries from the rest of the MENA countries, we implement a GCC dummy (GCC_dum) that 
takes the value of 1 for GCC countries and 0 otherwise. In addition, we use a non-GCC dummy (NGCC_dum) that 
takes the value of 1 for non-GCC countries and 0 otherwise. 
15 This is relative since GCC economies are more vulnerable to fluctuations in oil prices.  
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In their study, Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) use data from Laeven and Valencia’s 
(2008) work to examine the relationship between bank capital and risk in the crisis period. 
However, after examining an updated version of Laeven and Valencia’s (2012) work on 
banking crisis periods, we find a small number of countries operating in the MENA region 
that were affected during the period between 1999 and 2011. Therefore, we follow the work 
of Abedifar et al. (2013) and Beck et al. (2013) and consider 2008–2009 as the crisis period. 
Accordingly, we use a crisis time dummy (crisis) that takes the value of 1 in 2008–2009 and 0 
otherwise. We also add another dummy (normal) that – in contrast to the crisis dummy – 
represents the normal time period. As with banks in the GCC countries and non-GCC 
countries dummy variables, we include an interaction term between the capital ratios, the 
crisis time dummy and the normal time dummy. Table 6 Panel C shows no significant 
difference between the normal time and the crisis time. Banks with higher capital ratios have 
higher loan loss reserves, lower costs and higher profitability during the crisis time as well as 
the normal time period. Accordingly, capital matters for banks because of its ability to absorb 
losses as well as its role in reflecting bank asset quality. Our findings are similar to Anginer 
and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) who find that capital was successful in reducing bank systemic 
risk even for the period that followed the subprime crisis.  
Finally, to examine whether a country’s good governance has an influence on the 
impact of capital on risk and bank performance, we use the world governance indicator 
(world_gov) as computed by Kaufmann et al. (2006). This indicator combines six dimensions 
of governance. These dimensions reflect the capacity of citizens to choose their own 
government, the country’s political stability and the absence of violence, the government’s 
effectiveness, the regulatory quality, the rule of law and the control of corruption. We interact 
this indicator with capital ratios for banks in the GCC region and the rest of the banks in the 
MENA region to gauge any differences in the specific institutional variables between the two 
regions. The results are reported in Table 6 Panel D. We find that good governance has a 
more pronounced effect on the association between capital and risk in both regions. We even 
find that ratios such as common equity/ta and tangible equity/ta are now positively associated 
with the loan loss reserve ratio. In addition, we find that the positive impact of capital ratios 
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on bank performance is more important in magnitude in countries and regions with good 
governance. This suggests that a better institutional environment in terms of law and 
regulation, a democratic and transparent political system, a higher degree of freedom of 
expression and free media, and non-corrupt markets allow bank managers and regulators to 
more effectively monitor and screen risk and control for cost, thereby improving the 
relationship between capital, risk and bank performance.  
4.4. Robustness tests: controlling for the Arab Spring  
One major event that the MENA region has witnessed is the Arab Spring. In the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, the MENA countries recovered rapidly compared with 
Western countries, boosted by oil prices and the weak use of toxic financial instruments. 
However, by the end of 2010, political revolutions began to emerge. These revolutions 
overthrew several political regimes, which caused several Arab countries to suffer from 
instability and economic problems. Ghosh (2015) finds that the Arab revolutions decreased 
bank profitability and increased bank risk. Therefore, we follow Ghosh’s (2015) work16 and 
control for the Arab Spring using two separate equations: 
f(LLRGLP, CIRP, EARTAP)ijt = α + φ × bank_controlijt + β × PCA_capital_raijt +  
                             δ × GCC_dum × AS_1 + μ × NGCC_dum × AS_1 + εijt   (3)    
f(LLRGLP, CIRP, EARTAP)ijt = α + φ × bank_controlijt + β × PCA_capital_raijt  
           × GCC_dum × AS_1 +  δ × PCA_capital_raijt × NGCC_dum × AS_1 + εijt (4)    
In contrast to Ghosh’s (2015) work, we separate GCC countries and the rest of the 
MENA countries.17 We use Eq. (3) to control for the Arab Spring and Eq. (4) to examine the 
direct impact of the Arab Spring on the association between capital, risk and performance in 
                                                          
16 We use Arab Spring (AS_1), lagged by one year, a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country is severely affected 
by the Arab Spring and 0 otherwise.  
17 We separate the GCC countries from the rest of the MENA region because political regimes that govern the 
former are different from the latter. In addition, most of the GCC countries benefit from oil revenues and rapid 
economic development compared to the rest of the MENA countries. Thus, we expect non-GCC countries to be 
more vulnerable to political instability, and thus to financial distress.  
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countries that are more vulnerable to political transition and thus economic instability. 
PCA_capital_raijt is a vector of capital components created using Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA).18 PC1_basel2_rwa represents the overall capital measure. PC2_basel2_tier2 
is called the capital-like component. We also exclude Tier 2 capital measures (risk- and non-
risk-based other capital ratios) from PCA and perform another PCA. Accordingly, the 
PC3_basel2_extier2 component includes all the capital ratios (risk- and non-risk-weighted 
measures) but excludes the Tier 2 ratios. The last component, PC4_trad_capital, is called the 
traditional capital measure and excludes risk-based capital ratios and Tier 2 ratios.  
The results of Eq. (3) are presented in Table 7 Panel A for the main dependent variables 
and Panel B for the alternative risk and performance measures. We find that banks with 
higher capital components have higher reserves for loan loss, lower cost-to-income ratios and 
higher profitability ratios. As for the impact of the Arab Spring, our results indicate that 
political instability has a negative impact on bank profitability in the GCC countries (Panels A 
and B, Models 9, 11 and 12) and on bank efficiency in the rest of the MENA countries (Panel 
A, Models 5 to 8). The latter are more sensitive to political instability because revolutions are 
often longer in terms of time intervals and more complex in terms of agreement between 
political parties. Accordingly, political uncertainty can be rapidly reflected in the development 
of the economic sector, especially as the rest of the MENA countries do not have natural 
resources like those of GCC countries. In such circumstances, banks in the rest of MENA are 
required to spend even more money to provide a better risk management, monitoring and 
supervision of projects. We also notice that banks in the GCC countries require lower NIMP 
than banks in the rest of the MENA countries. One possible explanation is that the higher 
level of cost inefficiency in the non-GCC countries resulted in higher rates on loans. Another 
explanation is provided by Ghosh (2015): Banks demand higher interest margins in 
                                                          
18 To perform PCA, several steps need to be respected (Canbas et al., 2005; Shih et al., 2007; Klomp and de Haan, 
2012). First, the capital ratios need to be highly correlated. Second, we consult the measure of sampling adequacy 
(MSA). If a variable’s MSA is lower than 0.5, this variable is unacceptable and should be removed from the PCA 
(a higher MSA, e.g. >0.7, means that the variable is important and included in the PCA). Third, all the financial 
ratios are standardized with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Fourth, the choice of our latent variables 
depends on the eigenvalues and percentage of total variance. Therefore, we only consider components with 
eigenvalues greater than 1 and variance greater than 10%. The tables’ details (i.e. the eigenvalues of the 
components and the component loadings) are not reported to save space but are available from the authors upon 
request.  
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anticipation of a higher percentage of nonperforming loans. This is confirmed by our 
empirical results (Panel B, Models 1 to 3), in which we find a positive impact of the Arab 
Spring on the nonperforming loans ratio. Therefore, our results are consistent with the 
previous research in which political changes adversely affect bank risk and performance 
(Ghosh, 2015).   
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
Table 8 Panel A and Panel B present the direct impact of the Arab Spring on the 
association between capital, risk and bank performance.19 The results suggest that capital is 
more effective in requiring banks to hold higher reserves for loan loss in anticipation of more 
nonperforming loans in the period and countries of the Arab Spring. The results also show 
that higher capital ratios ameliorate bank efficiency, net interest margin and profits in NGCC 
countries during the period of Arab revolutions. Banks with higher capital ratios are more 
prudent and employ a wiser risk management (Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2014), 
resulting in increased supervision and monitoring (Chortareas et al., 2012; Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al., 2013), especially in periods of distress such as political instability. Accordingly, 
capitalized banks that are compliant with regulatory guidelines are likely to perform better 
than less capitalized banks in periods of political instability, resulting in higher efficiency and 
profitability. The impact of capital is more pronounced for NGCC countries because they 
have witnessed severe political perturbation (for example, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria) 
compared to GCC countries. Therefore, capital requirements are an important determinant of 
bank risk and performance in periods of political instability. 
[Insert Table 8 around here] 
4.5. Robustness tests: addressing endogeneity  
We complement our analysis by emphasizing the important role of a regulatory 
environment when examining the association between bank capital, risk, efficiency and 
                                                          
19 We only use the PC1_basel2_rwa and PC3_basel2_extier2 capital components of Basel II. We choose Basel II 
capital components to investigate whether risk-weighted assets are more effective during stressful situations, such 
as the Arab Spring.  
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profitability. These institutional variables may be associated with a possible endogeneity 
problem. Barth et al. (2013) argue that a potential endogeneity problem may be related to 
reverse causality. For instance, a risky bank with higher performance may have an important 
influence on the regulatory policies, for example the Basel Accords’ capital guidelines, in the 
sense of being more indulgent to the development and growth of the bank. Thus, capital 
requirements may be endogenous to the structure of the banking sector in each country. To 
address this endogeneity concern, we use: (1) the lagged values of our independent variables, 
and (2) an Instrumental Variables (IV) approach, which consists of two-stage regressions. 
Literature reports mixed views regarding the use of lagged (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013; 
Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2014) versus non-lagged (Altunbas et al., 2007; Banker et al., 
2010; Hsiao et al., 2010; Chortareasa et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2013) independent variables 
when examining the impact of banking regulation on bank risk and performance. Thus, in a 
first step we hypothesize that regulatory ratios might take one year to show its pronounced 
effect. In addition, a one-year lag of independent variables reduces any concerns about 
endogeneity. Therefore, we lagged our capital ratios by one year to examine the robustness of 
our results. Table 9 Panel A and Panel B report similar results for our main variables of 
interest as well as our alternative risk and performance measures, thereby confirming our 
earlier findings. 
[Insert Table 9 around here] 
In a second step, we use an IV approach. First, IV regresses each of our eight proxies of 
capital requirements on instruments and regressors as reported in baseline models (Table 2 to 
Table 4). Second, the predicted values of different capital ratios replace these ratios in 
baseline models. Current literature on capital requirements (Chortareas et al., 2012; Anginer 
and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2014) is largely silent about endogeneity 
and the lack of specific instruments that can be used when examining the association between 
capital and risk and capital and bank performance. In this study, we use the World 
Governance (world_gov) index as an instrument. Computed by the World Bank, it reports 
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aggregate and individual governance indicators for 215 economies worldwide.20 The index is 
basically the result of a survey by Kaufmann et al. (2006) reflecting the responses of a large 
number of enterprises, citizens and experts in industrial and developing countries. We use this 
index because it captures the institutional environment that plays a key role in shaping the 
financial development of economies. Moreover, we argue that it is less likely that the World 
Governance Index would have a direct effect on banking performance today. Instead, it might 
affect bank risk and performance through its impact on banking regulation, in particular 
capital requirements as reported in Table 6 Panel D.  
[Insert Table 10 around here] 
We follow Beck et al. (2009) and conduct an F-test of the excluded exogenous variables 
in the first-stage regressions. The null hypothesis of the test is that our instrument does not 
explain cross-sectional differences in capital regulatory guidelines and measures. We reject 
the null hypothesis at the 1% level in almost all models. The results of the first-stage 
regressions mainly show that smaller and more efficient banks have higher capital ratios. In 
addition, the World Governance Index is positively and significantly associated with capital 
ratios in almost all models. The results of the second-stage regressions are reported in Table 
10.21 We use different estimation techniques. In Panel A we use Two Least Squares 
regression (2SLS), in Panel B we use Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) and 
in Panel C we use Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The second stage regression 
results show a clear evidence of a positive and significant association between capital, risk 
and bank performance in almost all models and across different estimation techniques. These 
results provide additional support for our earlier findings and suggest that results are not 
driven by endogeneity.  
                                                          
20 For more details, see Section 4.3. 
21 We only report Chi2 and capital coefficients from the second-stage regressions and F-tests from the first-stage 
regressions to save space. Complete results for the first- and second-stage regressions are available from the 
authors upon request.  
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4.6. Robustness tests: a quantile regression and other estimation techniques 
In this section, we perform quantile regressions to highlight whether the capital 
components solution differs across risk and performance quantiles. One important feature of 
quantile regressions22 is that they allow for heterogeneous solutions to PCA capital 
components by conditioning on bank risk (less risky vs. highly risky), efficiency (less 
efficient vs. highly efficient) and profitability (less profitable vs. highly profitable). 
Accordingly, we use the following equation: 
f(LLRGLP, CIRP, EARTAP)ijt = α + φ × bank_controlijt + β × PCA_capital_raijt + εijt (5)    
Figures 1, 2 and 3 plot the quantile and the least squares regression estimates for all the 
components specified in the risk, efficiency and profitability models, respectively. For each 
covariate, we plot the quantile regression estimates for capital components as a function of 
quantiles ranging from 0.05 to 0.95, shown as the point wise solid curve. The shaded gray 
band illustrates the conventional 90% confidence interval, estimated using the bootstrapping 
technique. The long dashed line is the OLS estimate and the two dotted lines characterize a 
confidential band.  
Figure 1 shows the important differences between OLS and quantile regressions. Each 
of the PCA components shows that the effect of capital ratios is more important in magnitude 
at the upper tail of the risk component. This is not shown in the OLS graphs. Figure 1 
suggests that banks with higher capital ratios are more sensitive to risk – especially riskier 
banks – and prefer to increase their loan loss reserve ratio as a precautionary policy against 
risk, which coincides with the Basel recommendation that banks need to increase their capital 
commensurably with the amount of risk taken.  
Figure 2 shows that highly efficient banks are more responsive to capital requirements 
than less efficient banks. In other words, the negative impact of capital on cost inefficiency is 
more important in magnitude for highly efficient banks than less efficient ones.  
                                                          
22 The quantile regression results are also robust to outliers and distributions with heavy tails. The quantile 
regression also avoids the restrictive assumption that the error terms are identically distributed at all points of the 
conditional distribution.  
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Figure 3 suggests a positive and significant association between capital and profitability. 
The results appear to be stronger as the profitability ratio moves up towards the upper 
quantile.  
[Insert Figures 1, 2, 3 around here] 
We note that the capital-like (or PC2_basel2_tier2) component does not show the same 
pattern as the rest of the capital components in any of the three models (risk, efficiency and 
profitability); rather, it shows a destabilizing effect. Arnold et al. (2012) argue that the use of 
some capital is better than the use of other capital, while Dermine et al. (2015) explain that the 
BCBS Basel III Accord directs much more attention to common equity Tier 1 than other 
capital. Our results are in line with the BCBS and the two authors’ recommendations 
regarding banks in the MENA region. 
Finally, we examine the robustness of our results using four alternative estimation 
methods. First, we use the bootstrapping techniques with a random resample of 100 of the 168 
banks employed in our initial sample. We also correct for the heteroscedasticity of the 
standard errors. The results are presented in Table 11 Panel A and show that our results are 
more significant than before. Second, we use a fixed-effect model. The results are presented 
in Table 11 Panel B and show that the results are even stronger than our earlier regressions. 
Third, we use a random-effect regression model. The results are provided in Table 11 Panel C 
and show the same outcome.23 Finally, we use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimation 
technique to check for cross-sectional dependence. Table 11 Panel D shows that the results 
are even more robust.  
[Insert Table 11 around here] 
                                                          
23 We also performed a Hausman test to determine whether to choose random-effect or fixed-effect models. 
However, the results altered between the two models depending on capital measures. Therefore, we present the 
results for both models.  
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5. Conclusion  
This paper examines the impact of capital requirements on risk and bank performance 
for a sample of 168 banks in 17 MENA countries for the 1999–2013 period. We find that 
banks with higher capital ratios have higher loan loss reserves, are more efficient and are 
more profitable. The impact of capital requirements on bank efficiency and profitability is 
more important for too-big-to-fail banks and banks in countries with good governance. Higher 
capital in countries with an appropriate institutional environment can influence the investment 
strategies of larger banks towards more careful lending activities, prudent risk management 
and better supervision. This results in a better alignment of interests between bank owners and 
depositors, which reduces agency costs and ameliorates bank performance. The results persist 
only for the risk model when studying highly liquid banks. In addition, we find some 
differences in the effect of capital ratios when comparing banks in GCC countries with banks 
in the rest of the MENA region and banks during crisis time with banks during normal times, 
especially for capital-like ratios. Finally, an instrumental variables approach, alternative risk 
and performance measures, a principal component analysis, an examination of the Arab 
Spring period and other estimation techniques show very consistent results. 
Our results have important implications for regulators and policymakers in the MENA 
region. First, both risk-based and non-risk-based capital ratios have a pronounced effect on 
bank risk and performance. Therefore, the regulatory authorities in the MENA region need to 
promote the application of Basel III, which ameliorates bank efficiency and profitability, and 
bank protection against risk, especially in periods of stress, such as the financial crisis and the 
Arab Spring. Second, banks in the MENA region are less capable of dealing with capital-like 
ratios than those in GCC countries. We call on these banks to minimize their use of Tier 2 
ratios and regulators to be more prudent with banks that implement higher Tier 2 ratios in 
their capital. Finally, we show that the capital-like (Tier 2) element is more sensitive to loan 
loss reserves than capital of good quality (Tier 1 or common equity). Thus, banks are 
encouraged to increase the Tier 1 element in their capital adequacy ratio rather than the Tier 2 
element.  
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We find a number of limitations in our study. First, the sample is limited because there 
are many missing observations, especially for the period between 1999 and 2005. In addition, 
risk-based regulatory capital ratios are less available than the rest of the accounting measures. 
Accordingly, the additional econometric tests are limited due to the lack of availability of 
historical financial data. Second, we did not include market-based financial measures because 
most banks are unlisted. Finally, we find no studies that mainly focus on the impact of capital 
requirements on the risk and bank performance in the MENA region. Accordingly, our results 
and analyses are mainly inspired by the regulatory literature of developed countries.  
As regards future work, the research must be intensified when it comes to the banking 
regulation in the MENA region. Studies should be deepened when adapting the Basel III 
guidelines to banks in this region, especially as banking regulation depends on many internal 
and external heterogeneous factors. Applying a one-size-fits-all regulatory framework might 
penalize bank activities in one region compared with another. Therefore, we believe that 
comparative empirical studies between banks in the MENA region and banks in European 
countries or the United States are necessary to understand whether banks need to apply the 
different regulatory guidelines. The same is applicable for capital requirements and thus its 
impact on bank activities and funding strategies. 
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Table 1  
Summary of the descriptive statistics 
Label N Mean Median Std Dev. Min. Max. P25 P75 
Risk and performance models 
Loan loss reserves/gross loans 2132 9.26 5.54 10.33 0.44 62.78 3.04 11.58 
Non-performing loans/gross loans 1663 11.11 5.58 14.80 0.31 92.19 2.70 13.63 
Cost to income 2445 51.90 47.72 23.62 14.58 155.56 35.72 62.31 
Net interest margin 2501 1.45 1.36 1.71 -5.42 8.29 0.58 2.21 
Earnings/ta 2492 3.80 3.18 2.76 -0.39 18.96 2.42 4.27 
Earnings/gross loans 2482 4.51 2.80 11.02 -12.98 88 1.23 4.4 
Main variables and control variables  
Tier 1/rwa 1054 17.07 15.27 7.16 7.20 49.26 12.67 19.09 
Tier 2/rwa 1049 1.858 1.27 1.83 0.1 8.2 0.52 2.7 
Total capital/rwa 1579 20.26 17.42 9.74 8.31 67 14.39 22.51 
Tier 1/ta 1064 12.24 10.61 9.11 1.1 74.97 8.20 13.34 
Tier 2/ta 1047 1.30 0.80 1.41 0.08 6.49 0.31 1.83 
Total capital/ta 1237 13.22 11.73 9.06 0.01 73.63 8.91 14.82 
Tangible equity/ta 2515 13.57 11.33 9.79 0.75 63.06 7.92 15.59 
Common equity/ta 2515 13.07 10.65 9.78 0.97 63.06 7.58 14.85 
Size 2520 14.49 14.53 1.82 10.32 18.20 13.15 15.83 
Growth assets 2336 16.19 11.73 23.53 -30.66 140.11 3.82 21.99 
Net loans/ta 2496 45.89 46.24 20.28 1.67 99.11 30.55 60.94 
Income diversity 2296 0.43 0.39 0.35 0 1.75 0.29 0.53 
Note: The sample covers 168 banks from 17 MENA countries.
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Table 2 
Capital and risk model 
Notes: See Appendix A.1 for the variables’ definitions. The dependent variable is the bank loan loss 
reserves to gross loans (LLRGLP). The estimation is based on OLS regressions. Standard errors are 
clustered at the bank level and reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
Variables [1] 
LLRGLP 
[2] 
LLRGLP 
[3] 
LLRGLP 
[4] 
LLRGLP 
[5] 
LLRGLP 
[6] 
LLRGLP 
[7] 
LLRGLP 
[8] 
LLRGLP 
Size -0.668*** 
(0.25) 
-0.992*** 
(0.29) 
-1.049*** 
(0.30) 
-0.76** 
(0.32) 
-1.8*** 
(0.5) 
-0.78*** 
(0.1) 
-1.349*** 
(0.30) 
-1.314*** 
(0.31) 
Growth 
assets 
-0.072*** 
(0.01) 
-0.066*** 
(0.01) 
-0.079*** 
(0.01) 
-0.073*** 
(0.01) 
-0.084*** 
(0.02) 
-0.069*** 
(0.01) 
-0.078*** 
(0.01) 
-0.076*** 
(0.01) 
Net loans/ta -0.108*** 
(0.02) 
-0.121*** 
(0.02) 
-0.176*** 
(0.03) 
-0.187*** 
(0.03) 
-0.217*** 
(0.06) 
-0.206*** 
(0.03) 
-0.18*** 
(0.04) 
-0.18*** 
(0.04) 
Income 
diversity 
6.148*** 
(1.45) 
5.846*** 
(0.01) 
6.272*** 
(1.81) 
5.067*** 
(1.72) 
7.917*** 
(2.79) 
3.28** 
(1.59) 
6.004*** 
(1.25) 
6.1*** 
(1.27) 
Cost to 
income 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.0312 
(0.03) 
0.013 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.001 
(0.05) 
0.021 
(0.03) 
0.014 
(0.03) 
0.017 
(0.03) 
Tier 1/rwa 0.118 
(0.09) 
       
Tier 2/rwa  0.399*** 
(0.15) 
      
Total 
capital/rwa 
  0.208*** 
(0.08) 
     
Tier 1/ta    0.504*** 
(0.09) 
    
Tier 2/ta     0.824*** 
(0.28) 
   
Total 
capital/ta 
     0.487*** 
(0.1) 
  
Common 
equity/ta 
      0.2258 
(0.14) 
 
Tangible 
equity/ta 
       0.232 
(0.14) 
Constant 16.926*** 
(5.57) 
24.336*** 
(5.21) 
26.104*** 
(6.26) 
18.928*** 
(6.02) 
43.036*** 
(10.89) 
21.588*** 
(5.92) 
32.654*** 
(6.06) 
31.737*** 
(6.33) 
Observations 970 965 1416 958 946 1120 1877 1877 
R2 0.28 0.28 0.37 0.56 0.39 0.52 0.33 0.33 
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Table 3  
Capital and efficiency model 
Notes: See Appendix A.1 for the variables’ definitions. The dependent variable is the bank cost to income ratio 
(CIRP). The estimation is based on OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and 
reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
Variables [1] 
CIRP 
[2] 
CIRP 
[3] 
CIRP 
[4] 
CIRP 
[5] 
CIRP 
[6] 
CIRP 
[7] 
CIRP 
[8] 
CIRP 
Size -4.742*** 
(0.79) 
-3.745*** 
(14.14) 
-6.324*** 
(0.11) 
-4.56*** 
(0.19) 
-4.07*** 
(0.79) 
-4.9*** 
(0.74) 
-6.168*** 
(0.67) 
-6.275*** 
(0.67) 
Growth 
assets 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.019 
(0.03) 
0.053 
(0.04) 
0.036 
(0.04) 
0.033 
(0.04) 
0.056 
(0.74) 
-0.008 
(0.03) 
-0.012 
(0.03) 
Net loans/ta -0.193*** 
(0.06) 
-0.163** 
(0.07) 
-0.1819*** 
(0.06) 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
-0.155** 
(0.07) 
-0.119* 
(0.06) 
-0.073 
(0.06) 
-0.065 
(0.06) 
Income 
diversity 
-12.811* 
(6.77) 
-12.552* 
(7.17) 
-14.005*** 
(4.66) 
-10.972 
(7.27) 
-11.932 
(7.36) 
-12.584** 
(5.81) 
-8.761** 
(3.85) 
-8.958** 
(3.83) 
Loan loss 
reserves 
0.281 
(0.21) 
0.23 
(0.21) 
0.066 
(0.15) 
0.323* 
(0.18) 
-0.003 
(0.22) 
0.135 
(0.189) 
0.077 
(0.14) 
0.0916 
(0.14) 
Tier 1/rwa -0.574*** 
(0.15) 
       
Tier 2/rwa  -0.424 
(0.42) 
      
Total 
capital/rwa 
  -0.623*** 
(0.11) 
     
Tier 1/ta    -0.536*** 
(0.19) 
    
Tier 2/ta     -0.366 
(0.58) 
   
Total 
capital/ta 
     -0.4667*** 
(0.17) 
  
Common 
equity/ta 
      -0.642*** 
(0.13) 
 
Tangible 
equity/ta 
       -0.714*** 
(0.13) 
Constant 141.572*** 
(14.42) 
116.184*** 
(14.14) 
169.825*** 
(12.54) 
129.618*** 
(13.36) 
121.861*** 
(14.38) 
137.361*** 
(12.87) 
156.811*** 
(11.00) 
159.319*** 
(11.16) 
Observations 970 965 1416 958 946 1120 1877 1877 
R2 0.23 0.20 0.30 0.23 0.19 0.25 0.25 0.26 
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Table 4  
Capital and profitability 
Notes: See Appendix A.1 for the variables’ definitions. The dependent variable is the bank earnings to assets 
(EARTAP). The estimation is based on OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and 
reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
Variables [1] 
EARTAP 
[2] 
EARTAP 
[3] 
EARTAP 
[4] 
EARTAP 
[5] 
EARTAP 
[6] 
EARTAP 
[7] 
EARTAP 
[8] 
EARTAP 
Size 0.141*** 
(0.04) 
0.074 
(0.05) 
0.167*** 
(0.05) 
0.172*** 
(0.05) 
0.122** 
(0.06) 
0.144*** 
(0.05) 
0.2*** 
(0.03) 
0.208*** 
(0.03) 
Growth assets 0.005* 
(0.04) 
0.007** 
(0.00) 
0.004* 
(0.00) 
0.006** 
(0.00) 
0.007*** 
(0.00) 
0.005* 
(0.00) 
0.006*** 
(0.00) 
0.007*** 
(0.00) 
Net loans/ta 0.013*** 
(0.00) 
0.012*** 
(0.00) 
0.011*** 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
0.011** 
(0.00) 
-0.003 
(0.00) 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
Income diversity 1.031*** 
(0.35) 
1.035*** 
(0.38) 
1.01*** 
(0.31) 
0.801** 
(0.35) 
1.039** 
(0.44) 
0.797** 
(0.31) 
0.462* 
(0.24) 
0.495** 
(0.23) 
Loan loss reserves -0.034* 
(0.02) 
-0.025 
(0.02) 
-0.012 
(0.02) 
-0.039*** 
(0.01) 
0.015 
(0.03) 
-0.035*** 
(0.01) 
-0.022*** 
(0.01) 
-0.023*** 
(0.01) 
Tier 1/rwa 0.052*** 
(0.01) 
       
Tier 2/rwa  -0.07** 
(0.03) 
      
Total capital/rwa   0.046*** 
(0.01) 
     
Tier 1/ta    0.09*** 
(0.01) 
    
Tier 2/ta     -0.041 
(0.05) 
   
Total capital/ta      0.085*** 
(0.01) 
  
Common equity/ta       0.097*** 
(0.01) 
 
Tangible equity/ta        0.1*** 
(0.01) 
Constant -2.449*** 
(0.72) 
-0.389 
(0.73) 
-2.87*** 
(0.85) 
-2.311*** 
(0.64) 
-1.469 
(0.89) 
-1.803*** 
(0.68) 
-2.808*** 
(0.52) 
-3.016*** 
(0.52) 
Observations 970 965 1416 958 946 1120 1880 1880 
R2 0.19 0.12 0.16 0.31 0.07 0.29 0.31 0.33 
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Table 5  
Capital, bank size and too big to fail 
Notes: See Appendix A.1 for the variables’ definitions. The dependent variables are the bank loan loss reserves to 
gross loans (LLRGLP), the bank cost to income ratio (CIRP) and the bank earnings to assets (EARTAP). In the 
three models, we only show the variables of interest and the coefficients of the interaction between capital, bank 
size (size) and the too-big-to-fail dummy (tbtfa) to save space. The estimation is based on OLS regressions. 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
Panel A: size 
Variables LLRGLP CIRP EARTAP 
 Coef.  N R2 Coef. N R2 Coef. N R2 
Tier 1/rwa×size -0.098** 
(0.04) 
970 0.31 -0.214*** 
(0.07) 
970 0.25 0.013** 
(0.01) 
970 0.20 
Tier 2/rwa×size 0.013 
(0.12) 
965 0.28 0.627** 
(0.3) 
965 0.20 -0.012 
(0.03) 
965 0.12 
Total capital/rwa×size -0.063* 
(0.03) 
1416 0.37 -0.162** 
(0.07) 
1416 0.31 0.007 
(0.00) 
1416 0.16 
Tier 1/ta×size -0.085*** 
(0.03) 
958 0.58 -0.213*** 
(0.05) 
958 0.26 0.005 
(0.00) 
958 0.31 
Tier 2/ta×size -0.111 
(0.24) 
946 0.39 0.704* 
(0.42) 
946 0.19 -0.058 
(0.04) 
946 0.08 
Total capital/ta×size -0.084*** 
(0.02) 
1120 0.53 -0.28*** 
(0.05) 
1120 0.28 0.001 
(0.00) 
1120 0.29 
Common equity/ta×size -0.088** 
(0.04) 
1877 0.35 -0.231*** 
(0.07) 
1877 0.27 0.01** 
(0.00) 
1880 0.32 
Tangible equity/ta×size -0.079* 
(0.04) 
1877 0.35 -0.259*** 
(0.06) 
1877 0.29 0.012** 
(0.00) 
1880 0.34 
 
Panel B: too big to fail  
Variables LLRGLP CIRP EARTAP 
 Coef.  N R2 Coef. N R2 Coef. N R2 
Tier 1/rwa×tbtfa -0.326** 
(0.13) 
970 0.29 -0.549** 
(0.27) 
970 0.178 0.056*** 
(0.02) 
970 0.185 
Tier 2/rwa×tbtfa 0.11 
(0.28) 
965 0.26 1.755** 
(0.05) 
965 0.169 -0.109** 
(0.05) 
965 0.127 
Total capital/rwa×tbtfa -0.327*** 
(0.12) 
1416 0.36 -0.237 
(0.21) 
1416 0.179 0.012 
(0.02) 
1416 0.139 
Tier 1/ta×tbtfa -0.39** 
(0.17) 
958 0.56 -0.227 
(0.39) 
958 0.177 0.036 
(0.03) 
958 0.291 
Tier 2/ta×tbtfa -0.022 
(0.51) 
946 0.35 2.469** 
(1.00) 
946 0.157 -0.161** 
(0.07) 
946 0.076 
Total capital/ta×tbtfa -0.262 
(0.15) 
1120 0.52 -0.068 
(0.34) 
1120 0.181 0.000 
(0.02) 
1120 0.276 
Common equity/ta×tbtfa -0.353** 
(0.16) 
1877 0.32 -0.778** 
(0.36) 
1877 0.136 0.043* 
(0.02) 
1880 0.28 
 
Tangible equity/ta×tbtfa -0.382** 
(0.16) 
1877 0.32 -0.856** 
(0.35) 
1877 0.144 0.051** 
(0.02) 
1880 0.298 
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Table 6  
Sub-samples: highly liquid banks, GCC countries, the subprime crisis and governance 
Panel A: highly liquid banks 
Variables  LLRGLP   CIRP   EARTAP  
 Coef. N R2 Coef. N R2 Coef.  N R2 
Tier 1/rwa×h_liquid 0.075 
(0.13) 
970 0.28 -0.332 
(0.31) 
970 0.24 -0.015 
(0.02) 
970 0.19 
Tier 2/rwa×h_liquid 1.486* 
(0.84) 
965 0.29 1.636 
(1.90) 
965 0.20 -0.066 
(0.11) 
965 0.13 
Total capital/rwa×h_liquid 0.2 
(0.1656) 
1416 0.38 -0.128 
(0.19) 
1416 0.30 0.014 
(0.02) 
1416 0.16 
Tier 1/ta×h_liquid 0.584*** 
(0.11) 
958 0.60 -0.044 
(0.34) 
958 0.24 0.037** 
(0.02) 
958 0.32 
Tier 2/ta×h_liquid 5.645* 
(2.88) 
946 0.42 2.921 
(4.25) 
946 0.20 0.197 
(0.44) 
946 0.09 
Total capital/ta×h_liquid 0.543*** 
(0.09) 
1120 0.56 0.138 
(0.29) 
1120 0.26 0.043*** 
(0.01) 
1120 0.31 
Common equity/ta×h_liquid 0.455*** 
(0.14) 
1877 0.37 0.266 
(0.24) 
1877 0.27 0.003 
(0.01) 
1877 0.33 
Tangible equity/ta×h_liquid  0.448*** 
(0.14) 
1877 0.36 0.193 
(0.25) 
1877 0.26 0.007 
(0.01) 
1877 0.31 
 
Panel B: GCC vs. non-GCC countries 
Variables  LLRGLP   CIRP   EARTAP  
 Coef. N R2 Coef. N R2 Coef.  N R2 
Tier 1/rwa×GCC_dum 
 
0.167 
(0.10) 
970 0.29 -0.882*** 
(0.31) 
970 0.35 0.062*** 
(0.01) 
970 0.21 
Tier 1/rwa×NGCC_dum 
 
0.073 
(0.08) 
  -0.144 
(0.15) 
  0.037*** 
(0.01) 
  
Tier 2/rwa×GCC_dum 
 
0.419** 
(0.18) 
965 0.28 -1.625*** 
(0.49) 
965 0.25 -0.024 
(0.03) 
965 0.14 
Tier 2/rwa×NGCC_dum 
 
0.364 
(0.25) 
  1.823*** 
(0.67) 
  -0.155*** 
(0.04) 
  
Total capital/rwa×GCC_dum 
 
0.227** 
(0.09) 
1416 0.37 -0.951*** 
(0.13) 
1416 0.38 0.058*** 
(0.00) 
1416 0.18 
Total capital/rwa×NGCC_dum 
 
0.197** 
(0.09) 
  -0.335** 
(0.13) 
  0.036*** 
(0.01) 
  
Tier 1/ta×GCC_dum 
 
0.511*** 
(0.13) 
958 0.56 -1.226*** 
(0.20) 
958 0.33 0.103*** 
(0.01) 
958 0.31 
Tier 1/ta×NGCC_dum 
 
0.502*** 
(0.1) 
  -0.305 
(0.21) 
  0.0861*** 
(0.01) 
  
Tier 2/ta×GCC_dum 
 
0.794*** 
(0.28) 
946 0.39 -1.847*** 
(0.61) 
946 0.24 -0.005 
(0.05) 
946 0.08 
Tier 2/ta×NGCC_dum 
 
0.899* 
(0.47) 
  3.387*** 
(1.03) 
  -0.135* 
(0.07) 
  
Total capital/ta×GCC_dum 
 
0.466*** 
(0.11) 
1120 0.52 -1.006*** 
(0.18) 
1120 0.33 0.092*** 
(0.01) 
1120 0.29 
Total capital/ta×NGCC_dum 
 
0.495*** 
(0.10) 
  -0.15 
(0.21) 
  0.081*** 
(0.01) 
  
Common equity/ta×GCC_dum 
 
0.214 
(0.13) 
1877 0.33 -1.33*** 
(0.16) 
1877 0.32 0.115*** 
(0.01) 
1877 0.32 
Common equity/ta×NGCC_dum 0.229 
(0.15) 
  -0.35** 
(0.14) 
  0.089*** 
(0.00) 
  
Tangible equity/ta×GCC_dum 
 
0.221* 
(0.13) 
1877 0.34 -1.333*** 
(0.14) 
1877 0.33 0.115*** 
(0.01) 
1877 0.34 
Tangible equity/ta×NGCC_dum 
 
0.236 
(0.15) 
  -0.4*** 
(0.14) 
  0.093 
(0.01) 
  
 
Panel C: subprime vs. normal time 
Variables  LLRGLP   CIRP   EARTAP  
 Coef. N R2 Coef. N R2 Coef.  N R2 
Tier 1/rwa×crisis 
 
0.142 
(0.1) 
970 0.28 -0.502*** 
(0.17) 
970 0.23 0.038*** 
(0.01) 
970 0.20 
Tier 1/rwa×normal 
 
0.112 
(0.08) 
  -0.589*** 
(0.15) 
  0.055*** 
(0.01) 
  
Tier 2/rwa×crisis 
 
0.407* 
(0.24) 
965 0.28 -0.331 
(0.51) 
965 0.20 -0.151*** 
(0.04) 
965 0.13 
Tier 2/rwa×normal 
 
0.398*** 
(0.15) 
  -0.446 
(0.42) 
  -0.051 
(0.03) 
  
Total capital/rwa×crisis 
 
0.224** 
(0.08) 
1416 0.37 -0.55*** 
(0.14) 
1416 0.30 0.038*** 
(0.01) 
1416 0.16 
Total capital/rwa×normal 
 
0.205*** 
(0.08) 
  -0.656*** 
(0.11) 
  0.048*** 
(0.01) 
  
Tier 1/ta×crisis 0.504*** 958 0.56 -0.543*** 958 0.23 0.092*** 958 0.31 
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 (0.09) (0.18) (0.01) 
Tier 1/ta×normal 
 
0.504*** 
(0.09) 
  -0.533*** 
(0.2) 
  0.09*** 
(0.01) 
  
Tier 2/ta×crisis 
 
0.656* 
(0.37) 
946 0.39 -0.453 
(0.66) 
946 0.19 -0.109* 
(0.06) 
946 0.08 
Tier 2/ta×normal 
 
0.861*** 
(0.27) 
  -0.346 
(0.6) 
  -0.027 
(0.05) 
  
Total capital/ta×crisis 
 
0.484*** 
(0.11) 
1120 0.52 -0.403** 
(0.18) 
1120 0.25 0.082*** 
(0.01) 
1120 0.29 
Total capital/ta×normal 
 
0.487*** 
(0.09) 
  -0.484*** 
(0.18) 
  0.0857*** 
(0.01) 
  
Common equity/ta×crisis 
 
0.235 
(0.17) 
1877 0.33 -0.488*** 
(0.14) 
1877 0.25 0.085*** 
(0.01) 
1880 0.31 
Common equity/ta×normal 
 
0.224 
(0.14) 
  -0.671*** 
(0.13) 
  0.099*** 
(0.01) 
  
Tangible equity/ta×crisis 
 
0.257 
(0.17) 
1877 0.34 -0.594*** 
(0.14) 
1877 0.26 0.094*** 
(0.01) 
1877 0.33 
Tangible equity/ta×normal 
 
0.228 
(0.14) 
  -0.731*** 
(0.13) 
  0.101*** 
(0.01) 
  
 
Panel D: world governance indicator 
Variables  LLRGLP   CIRP   EARTAP  
 Coef. N R2 Coef. N R2 Coef.  N R2 
Tier 1/rwa×GCCD×world_gov 0.257 
(0.26) 
970 0.28 -1.156*** 
(0.23) 
970 0.26 0.080*** 
(0.01) 
970 0.23 
Tier 1/rwa×NGCCD×world_gov 0.128 
(0.13) 
  -0.114 
(0.25) 
  0.052*** 
(0.02) 
  
Tier 2/rwa×GCCD×world_gov 0.62** 
(0.29) 
956 0.27 -2.191*** 
(0.75) 
956 0.24 -0.041 
(0.05) 
956 0.14 
Tier 2/rwa×NGCCD×world_gov 0.608 
(0.42) 
  3.21*** 
(1.14) 
  -0.255*** 
(0.08) 
  
Total capital/rwa× 
GCCD×world_gov 
0.312** 
(0.14) 
1394 0.37 -1.296*** 
(0.19) 
1394 0.36 0.08*** 
(0.01) 
1394 0.17 
Total capital/rwa× 
NGCCD×world_gov 
0.322** 
(0.16) 
  -0.486** 
(0.23) 
  0.059*** 
(0.02) 
  
Tier 1/ta×GCCD×world_gov 0.75*** 
(0.19) 
949 0.57 -1.757*** 
(0.30) 
949 0.31 0.138*** 
(0.02) 
949 0.29 
Tier 1/ta×NGCCD×world_gov 0.825*** 
(0.16) 
  -0.54 
(0.35) 
  0.131*** 
(0.02) 
  
Tier 2/ta×GCCD×world_gov 1.17*** 
(0.43) 
937 0.39 -2.518*** 
(0.94) 
937 0.24 -0.022 
(0.07) 
937 0.09 
Tier 2/ta×NGCCD× 
GCCD×world_gov 
1.489* 
(0.77) 
  5.879*** 
(1.66) 
  -0.227* 
(0.12) 
  
Total capital/ta× 
GCCD×world_gov 
0.691*** 
(0.16) 
1098 0.53 -1.483*** 
(0.26) 
1098 0.33 0.127*** 
(0.02) 
1098 0.28 
Total capital/ta× 
NGCCD×world_gov 
0.817*** 
(0.16) 
  -0.311 
(0.34) 
  0.127*** 
(0.02) 
  
Common equity/ta× 
GCCD×world_gov 
0.34* 
(0.19) 
1834 0.36 -1.86*** 
(0.24) 
1834 0.32 0.162*** 
(0.02) 
1834 0.30 
Common equity/ta× 
NGCCD×world_gov 
0.457* 
(0.25) 
  -0.509* 
(0.26) 
  0.142*** 
(0.02) 
  
Tangible equity/ta× 
GCCD×world_gov 
0.344* 
(0.18) 
1834 0.36 -1.855*** 
(0.22) 
1834 0.33 0.161*** 
(0.01) 
1834 0.32 
Tangible equity/ta× 
NGCCD×world_gov 
0.463 
(0.25) 
  -0.581** 
(0.26) 
  0.148*** 
(0.02) 
  
(Continued) 
Notes: See Appendix A.1 for the variables’ definitions. The dependent variables are the bank loan loss reserves to gross loans 
(LLRGLP), the bank cost to income ratio (CIRP) and the bank earnings to assets (EARTAP). In the three models, we only employ 
the variables of interest and the coefficients of the interaction between capital and highly liquid banks (h_liquid) (Model A) and crisis 
period (Model B) to save space. The estimation is based on OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and 
reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 7  
Bank capital, risk and performance: controlling for the Arab Spring 
Notes: See Appendix A.1 for the variables’ definitions. The estimation is based on OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and reported in parentheses below their coefficient 
estimates.  
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
Panel A: controlling for the Arab Spring 
 LLRGLP  CIRP  EARTAP 
 [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8]  [9] [10] [11] [12] 
 X1=PC1 X2=PC2 X3=PC3 X4=PC4  X1=PC1 X2=PC2 X3=PC3 X4=PC4  X1=PC1 X2=PC2 X3=PC3 X4=PC4 
GCC_dum*AS_1 
 
0.346 
(0.55) 
0.782 
(0.57) 
0.325 
(0.55) 
-0.055 
(0.65) 
 -0.431 
(2.49) 
-1.795 
(2.66) 
-0.385 
(2.48) 
-0.933 
(2.50) 
 -0.339** 
(0.13) 
-0.132 
(0.15) 
-0.341** 
(0.13) 
-0.345** 
(0.13) 
NGCC_dum*AS_1 
 
-0.252 
(1.06) 
-0.003 
(1.23) 
-0.233 
(1.06) 
-1.157 
(0.77) 
 5.028*** 
(1.87) 
4.907** 
(2.05) 
4.971*** 
(1.87) 
6.268*** 
(2.37) 
 -0.181 
(0.11) 
-0.223 
(0.16) 
-0.174 
(0.11) 
-0.35** 
(0.15) 
PC1_basel2_rwa 0.764* 
(0.4) 
    -2.047*** 
(0.59) 
    0.255*** 
(0.04) 
   
PC2_basel2_ tier2  0.544** 
(0.22) 
    -0.741 
(0.58) 
    -0.038 
(0.04) 
  
PC3_basel2_extier2   0.78* 
(0.4) 
    -2.077*** 
(0.59) 
    0.255*** 
(0.04) 
 
PC4_trad_capital    2.292*** 
(0.49) 
    -2.625*** 
(0.85) 
    0.453*** 
(0.05) 
Constant  
 
21.068*** 
(4.87) 
28.983*** 
(5.95) 
20.998*** 
(4.87) 
25.387*** 
(6.04) 
 118.099*** 
(14.08) 
108.037*** 
(15.03) 
117.908*** 
(14.10) 
119.017*** 
(13.38) 
 -1.622** 
(0.11) 
-0.86 
(0.76) 
-1.585** 
(0.70) 
-1.38** 
(0.66) 
Bank_control Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 822 822 822 932  822 822 822 932  822 822 822 932 
R2 0.32 0.29 0.32 0.53  0.23 0.19 0.23 0.24  0.27 0.12 0.27 0.34 
 
Panel B: Controlling for the Arab Spring using alternative risk and performance measures 
 NPLGLP  NIMP  EARGLP 
 [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8]  [9] [10] [11] [12] 
 X1=PC1 X2=PC2 X3=PC3 X4=PC4  X1=PC1 X2=PC2 X3=PC3 X4=PC4  X1=PC1 X2=PC2 X3=PC3 X4=PC4 
GCC_dum*AS_1 
 
2.151* 
(1.25) 
2.696* 
(1.39) 
2.125* 
(1.25) 
1.291 
(1.32) 
 -0.68*** 
(0.16) 
-0.51*** 
(0.17) 
-0.68*** 
(0.16) 
-0.743*** 
(0.17) 
 -1.118*** 
(0.39) 
-0.227 
(0.30) 
-1.133*** 
(0.4) 
-1.702** 
(1.37) 
NGCC_dum*AS_1 
 
1.138 
(1.51) 
1.442 
(1.75) 
1.162 
(1.51) 
-1.029 
(1.07) 
 0.394** 
(0.17) 
0.324 
(0.2) 
0.398** 
(0.17) 
0.242 
(0.18) 
 0.621 
(0.86) 
0.525 
(1.2) 
0.651 
(0.87) 
0.021 
(1.37) 
PC1_basel2_rwa 0.938 
(0.58) 
    0.179*** 
(0.05) 
    1.18*** 
(0.38) 
   
PC2_basel2_ tier2  0.65** 
(0.32) 
    -0.117** 
(0.05) 
    0.054 
(0.13) 
  
PC3_basel2_extier2   0.958 
(0.58) 
    0.177*** 
(0.05) 
    1.182*** 
(0.38) 
 
PC4_trad_capital    3.297*** 
(0.73) 
    0.391*** 
(0.09) 
    3.391*** 
(0.71) 
Constant  
 
44.636*** 
(7.26) 
54.318*** 
(1.75) 
44.533*** 
(7.23) 
49.312*** 
(8.18) 
 4.737*** 
(1.02) 
4.929*** 
(1.04) 
4.772*** 
(1.02) 
4.113*** 
(0.99) 
 -3.294 
(2.93) 
1.088 
(2.53) 
-3.133 
(2.91) 
-6.469 
(4.28) 
Bank_control Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 804 804 804 901  822 822 822 932  822 822 822 932 
R2 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.57  0.33 0.3 0.33 0.35  0.34 0.11 0.34 0.60 
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Table 8  
Bank capital, risk and performance: the impact of the Arab Spring 
Notes: See Appendix A.1 for the variables’ definitions. The estimation is based on OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered at 
the bank level and reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.  
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
Panel A: bank capital, risk and performance 
Variables LLRGLP CIRP EARTAP 
 Coef.  N R2 Coef. N R2 Coef. N R2 
PC1_basel2_rwa×GCC_dum×AS_1 0.842** 
(0.41) 
822 0.33 -2.786 
(2.07) 
822 0.19 0.202 
(0.13) 
822 0.14 
PC1_basel2_rwa×NGCC_dum×AS_1 
 
2.044*** 
(0.50) 
  -2.117*** 
(0.49) 
  0.254*** 
(0.05 
  
PC3_basel2_extier2×GCC_dum×AS_1 0.838** 
(0.42) 
822 0.33 -2.823 
(2.07) 
822 0.19 0.2 
(0.13) 
822 0.14 
PC3_basel2_extier2×NGCC_dum×AS_1 
 
2.039*** 
(0.51) 
  -2.109*** 
(0.49) 
  0.255*** 
(0.05) 
  
 
Panel B: alternative measures of  bank risk and performance 
Variables NPLGLP NIMP EARGLP 
 Coef.  N R2 Coef. N R2 Coef. N R2 
PC1_basel2_rwa×GCC_dum×AS_1 2.601** 
(1.13) 
804 0.38 0.082 
(0.17) 
804 0.27 0.082 
(0.45) 
804 0.29 
PC1_basel2_rwa×NGCC_dum×AS_1 
 
2.844*** 
(0.79) 
  0.231*** 
(0.04) 
  2.813*** 
(0.61) 
  
PC3_basel2_extier2×GCC_dum×AS_1 2.575** 
(1.14) 
804 0.38 0.078 
(0.18) 
804 0.27 0.082 
(0.45) 
804 0.29 
PC3_basel2_extier2×NGCC_dum×AS_1 
 
2.832*** 
(0.80) 
  0.231*** 
(0.04) 
  2.805*** 
(0.61) 
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Table 9  
Bank capital, risk and performance: one-year lag 
Panel A: one-year lag of capital ratios 
Variables  LLRGLP   CIRP   EARTAP  
 Coef. N R2 Coef. N R2 Coef.  N R2 
Tier 1/rwa_1 0.04 
(0.0833) 
895 0.2712 -0.433*** 
(0.1468) 
895 0.2082 0.035*** 
(0.009) 
895 0.1494 
Tier 2/rwa_1 0.457*** 
(0.1675) 
891 0.2847 -0.586 
(0.4071) 
891 0.1887 -0.047 
(0.0331) 
891 0.1181 
Total capital/rwa_1 0.168** 
(0.079) 
1305 0.3689 -0.489*** 
(0.1144) 
1305 0.2887 0.035*** 
(0.0098) 
1305 0.1405 
Tier 1/ta_1 0.477*** 
(0.0983) 
862 0.5585 -0.326 
(0.2026) 
862 0.2115 0.064*** 
(0.011) 
862 0.2032 
Tier 2/ta_1 0.862*** 
(0.2864) 
846 0.3981 -0.164 
(0.6211) 
846 0.1903 -0.043 
(0.0446) 
846 0.0752 
Total capital/ta_1 0.498*** 
(0.0907) 
1014 0.5388 -0.315 
(0.1901) 
1014 0.2460 0.065*** 
(0.0109) 
1014 0.2168 
Common equity/ta_1 0.217 
(0.1482) 
1769 0.3327 -0.533*** 
(0.1409) 
1769 0.2485 0.077*** 
(0.0099) 
1771 0.2388 
Tangible equity/ta_1 0.229 
(0.1467) 
1769 0.3351 -0.607*** 
(0.1418) 
1877 0.2581 0.081*** 
(0.0094) 
1771 0.2388 
 
Panel B: one-year lag of capital ratios using alternative risk and performance measures 
Variables  NPLGLP   NIMP   EARGLP  
 Coef. N R2 Coef. N R2 Coef.  N R2 
Tier 1/rwa_1 0.086 
(0.12) 
873 0.32 0.026* 
(0.01) 
895 0.29 0.069 
(0.06) 
895 0.16 
Tier 2/rwa_1 0.495** 
(0.23) 
869 0.33 -0.095*** 
(0.03) 
891 0.29 -0.221 
(0.15) 
891 0.16 
Total capital/rwa_1 0.206 
(0.13) 
1218 0.36 0.026** 
(0.01) 
1305 0.23 0.176* 
(0.09) 
1305 0.21 
Tier 1/ta_1 0.705*** 
(0.14) 
840 0.60 0.058*** 
(0.01) 
862 0.33 0.598*** 
(0.11) 
862 0.57 
Tier 2/ta_1 0.964** 
(0.40) 
824 0.43 -0.14** 
(0.06) 
846 0.28 -0.181 
(0.24) 
846 0.35 
Total capital/ta_1 0.683*** 
(0.15) 
979 0.53 0.059*** 
(0.02) 
1014 0.31 0.621*** 
(0.12) 
1014 0.52 
Common equity/ta_1 0.436* 
(0.25) 
1423 0.36 0.097*** 
(0.02) 
1771 0.36 0.534*** 
(0.15) 
1771 0.36 
Tangible equity/ta_1 0.437* 
(0.26) 
1423 0.36 0.094*** 
(0.02) 
1771 0.35 0.539*** 
(0.15) 
1771 0.36 
Notes: See Appendix A.1 for the variables’ definitions. The estimation is based on OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered 
at the bank level and reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.  
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 10 
Controlling for endogeneity: an IV approach 
Panel A: using two stage least squares (2sls) 
Variables LLRGLP CIRP EARTAP 
 Coef.  N Chi2 F Coef. N Chi2 F Coef. N Chi2 F 
Tier 1/rwa 1.01 
(0.618) 
970 50.54*** 4.91** -3.52*** 
(1.3075) 
970 31.92*** 7.14*** 0.26*** 
(0.0922) 
970 24.55*** 7.14*** 
Tier 2/rwa 9.5 
(11.6485) 
965 15.34** 0.69 -4.95 
(7.2755) 
965 3.64 0.49 3.73 
(5.6119) 
965 2.76 0.49 
Total capital/rwa 1.262* 
(0.7414) 
1416 65.26*** 2.93* -3.127** 
(1.3266) 
1416 39.05*** 4.43*** 0.253** 
(0.115) 
1416 11.01* 4.43** 
Tier 1/ta 0.569*** 
(0.1563) 
958 185.76*** 8.4*** -1.656*** 
(0.5708) 
958 46.75*** 17.29*** 0.127*** 
(0.028) 
958 62.29*** 17.29*** 
Tier 2/ta 10.858 
(6.7262) 
946 32.25*** 4.62** -2.959 
(3.4817) 
946 11.61* 2.76* 2.32 
(1.6326) 
946 9.41 2.76* 
Total capital/ta 0.61*** 
(0.1482) 
1120 177.89*** 11.79*** -1.643*** 
(0.5575) 
1120 58.72*** 27.03*** 0.123*** 
(0.0286) 
1120 71.28*** 27.04*** 
Common 
equity/ta 
0.895** 
(0.3734) 
1877 139.95*** 6.09** -2.611*** 
(0.8684) 
1877 70.26*** 10.83*** 0.184*** 
(0.0402) 
1880 53.65*** 10.69*** 
Tangible 
equity/ta 
0.7** 
(0.2754) 
1877 155.29*** 10.4*** -2.05*** 
(0.583) 
1877 81.85*** 17.76*** 0.144*** 
(0.0266) 
1880 67.88*** 17.59*** 
 
Panel B:  using limited information maximum likelihood (liml) 
Variables LLRGLP CIRP EARTAP 
 Coef.  N Chi2 F Coef. N Chi2 F Coef. N Chi2 F 
Tier 1/rwa 1.01** 
(0.4057) 
970 81.76*** 13.46*** -3.52*** 
(0.8488) 
970 72.81*** 22.68*** 0.26*** 
(0.0611) 
970 56.64*** 22.68*** 
Tier 2/rwa 9.5 
(7.7061) 
965 31.17*** 1.66 -4.95 
(4.4442) 
965 9.43 1.26 3.73 
(3.4865) 
965 5.08 1.26 
Total capital/rwa 1.262* 
(0.4058) 
1416 180.28*** 12.73*** -3.127** 
(0.7254) 
1416 139.13*** 19.32*** 0.253** 
(0.0582) 
1416 49.33*** 19.32*** 
Tier 1/ta 0.569*** 
(0.0897) 
958 632.72*** 48.68*** -1.656*** 
(0.3369) 
958 142.79*** 79.99*** 0.127*** 
(0.018) 
958 159.31*** 79.99*** 
Tier 2/ta 10.86*** 
(3.571) 
946 116.76*** 12.99*** -2.959 
(1.1433) 
946 37.47*** 8.04*** 2.32** 
(09321) 
946 20.61*** 8.04*** 
Total capital/ta 0.61*** 
(0.0837) 
1120 633.97*** 66.56*** -1.643*** 
(0.3155) 
1120 215.48*** 107.88*** 0.123*** 
(0.0178) 
1120 171.24*** 107.88*** 
Common 
equity/ta 
0.895*** 
(0.1996) 
1877 427.02*** 28.82*** -2.611*** 
(0.4546) 
1877 262.82*** 47.83*** 0.184*** 
(0.0249) 
1880 147.85*** 47.06*** 
Tangible 
equity/ta 
0.7*** 
(0.1431) 
1877 461.71*** 48.83*** -2.05*** 
(0.583) 
1877 323.46*** 79.05*** 0.144*** 
(0.0173) 
1880 184.41*** 78.00*** 
 
Panel C: using generalized method of moments (GMM) 
Variables LLRGLP CIRP EARTAP 
 Coef.  N Chi2 F Coef. N Chi2 F Coef. N Chi2 F 
Tier 1/rwa 1.01** 
(0.4136) 
970 82.45*** 17.18*** -3.52*** 
(1.0761) 
970 60.39*** 26.44*** 0.26*** 
(0.663) 
970 61.4*** 26.44*** 
Tier 2/rwa 9.5 965 4.08 2.16 -4.95 965 1.33 1.61 3.73 965 0.74 1.61 
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(Continued) 
Notes: See Appendix A.1 for the variables’ definitions. This table presents the results after using the Instrumental Variables (IV) approach to 
control for endogeneity. The results only present the second stage regression.  In Panel A, we use a 2 Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation 
technique. In Panel B, we use Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimation technique. In Panel C, we employ Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level in Panel A, robust in Panel B, and bootstrapped 
based on a 100 resampling in Panel C. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.  
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
(28.3619) (4.3214) (11.5332) 
Total capital/rwa 1.262 
(1.7521) 
1416 168.13*** 28.9*** -3.127** 
(0.9858) 
1416 88.33*** 30.1*** 0.253** 
(0.0539) 
1416 56.94*** 30.1*** 
Tier 1/ta 0.569*** 
(0.0832) 
958 733.46*** 129.78*** -1.656*** 
(0.3719) 
958 200.24*** 107.43*** 0.127*** 
(0.0169) 
958 161.62*** 107.43*** 
Tier 2/ta 10.858 
(4.098) 
946 98.01*** 12.76*** -2.959 
(1.5155) 
946 24.45*** 8.17*** 2.32 
(1.5436) 
946 10.47 8.17*** 
Total capital/ta 0.61*** 
(0.098) 
1120 564.75*** 172.26*** -1.643*** 
(0.2943) 
1120 279.77*** 131.56*** 0.123*** 
(0.0183) 
1120 193.42*** 131.56*** 
Common 
equity/ta 
0.895** 
(0.2011) 
1877 420.2*** 66.87*** -2.611*** 
(0.4762) 
1877 213.74*** 79.96*** 0.184*** 
(0.0234) 
1880 121.14*** 78.77*** 
Tangible 
equity/ta 
0.7** 
(0.1612 
1877 609.43*** 113.30*** -2.05*** 
(0.3373) 
1877 343.54*** 133.45*** 0.144*** 
(0.018) 
1880 167.98*** 131.89*** 
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Table 11   
Alternative estimation techniques 
Panel A: bootstrapped standard errors based on a resample of 100 
Variables  LLRGLP   CIRP   EARTAP  
 Coef.  N R2 Coef. N R2 Coef. N R2 
Tier 1/rwa 0.118** 
(0.05) 
970 0.27 -0.573*** 
(0.11) 
970 0.23 0.052*** 
(0.01) 
970 0.18 
Tier 2/rwa 0.399*** 
(0.09) 
965 0.27 -0.424* 
(0.23) 
965 0.19 -0.069*** 
(0.02) 
965 0.11 
Total capital/rwa 0.208*** 
(0.04) 
1416 0.36 -0.623*** 
(0.08) 
1416 0.30 0.046*** 
(0.01) 
1416 0.15 
Tier 1/ta 0.504*** 
(0.04) 
958 0.56 -0.536*** 
(0.12) 
958 0.23 0.09*** 
(0.01) 
958 0.30 
Tier 2/ta 0.824*** 
(0.16) 
946 0.39 -0.366 
(0.35) 
946 0.18 -0.041 
(0.03) 
946 0.07 
Total capital/ta 0.487*** 
(0.05) 
1120 0.51 -0.467*** 
(0.11) 
1120 0.25 0.084*** 
(0.01) 
1120 0.29 
Common equity/ta 0.226*** 
(0.05) 
1877 0.33 
 
-0 .642*** 
(0.08) 
1877 0.25 0.097*** 
(0.01) 
1880 0.31 
Tangible equity/ta 0.232*** 
(0.06) 
1877 0.33 -0.713*** 
(0.07) 
1877 0.26 0.1*** 
(0.01) 
1880 0.33 
 
Panel B: using a fixed-effect model 
Variables  LLRGLP   CIRP   EARTAP  
 Coef.  N R2 Coef. N R2 Coef. N R2 
Tier 1/rwa 0.126*** 
(0.43) 
970 0.26 -0.58*** 
(0.09) 
970 0.24 0.051*** 
(0.01) 
970 0.18 
Tier 2/rwa 0.409*** 
(0.07) 
965 0.26 -0.352** 
(0.18) 
965 0.20 -0.083*** 
(0.02) 
965 0.12 
Total capital/rwa 0.213*** 
(0.03) 
1416 0.35 -0.625*** 
(0.05) 
1416 0.30 0.045*** 
(0.01) 
1416 0.14 
Tier 1/ta 0.524*** 
(0.02) 
958 0.56 -0.573*** 
(0.09) 
958 0.24 0.093*** 
(0.01) 
958 0.31 
Tier 2/ta 0.858*** 
(0.14) 
946 0.38 -0.319 
(0.26) 
946 0.19 -0.048 
(0.03) 
946 0.06 
Total capital/ta 0.513*** 
(0.02) 
1120 0.52 -0.512*** 
(0.11) 
1120 0.26 
 
0.087*** 
(0.01) 
1120 0.29 
Common equity/ta 0.256*** 
(0.04) 
1877 0.33 -0.748*** 
(0.08) 
1877 0.27 0.104*** 
(0.01) 
1877 0.33 
Tangible equity/ta 0.253*** 
(0.04) 
1877 0.32 -0.784*** 
(0.07) 
1877 0.28 0.104*** 
(0.01) 
1877 0.34 
 
Panel C: using a random-effect model 
Variables  LLRGLP   CIRP   EARTAP  
 Coef.  N R2 Coef. N R2 Coef. N R2 
Tier 1/rwa 0.118*** 
(0.03) 
970 0.26 -0.573*** 
(0.08) 
970 0.24 0.051*** 
(0.01) 
970 0.18 
Tier 2/rwa 0.399*** 
(0.08) 
965 0.26 -0.424* 
(0.23) 
965 0.20 -0.078*** 
(0.03) 
965 0.12 
Total capital/rwa 0.208*** 
(0.04) 
1416 0.35 -0.623*** 
(0.06) 
1416 0.30 0.046*** 
(0.01) 
1416 0.14 
Tier 1/ta 0.504*** 
(0.02) 
958 0.56 -0.547*** 
(0.86) 
958 0.24 0.092*** 
(0.01) 
958 0.32 
Tier 2/ta 0.824*** 
(0.10) 
946 0.38 -0.354 
(0.23) 
946 0.19 -0.045* 
(0.02) 
946 0.06 
Total capital/ta 0.487*** 
(0.02) 
1120 0.52 -0.486*** 
(0.11) 
1120 0.26 0.087*** 
(0.01) 
1120 0.29 
Common equity/ta 0.226*** 
(0.04) 
1877 0.32 -0.642*** 
(0.09) 
1877 0.27 0.097*** 
(0.01) 
1877 0.32 
Tangible equity/ta 0.232*** 
(0.05) 
1877 0.32 -0.713*** 
(0.08) 
1877 0.28 0.1*** 
(0.01) 
1877 0.34 
 
Panel D: using Fama–McBeth regressions 
Variables  LLRGLP   CIRP   EARTAP  
 Coef.  N R2 Coef. N R2 Coef. N R2 
Tier 1/rwa 0.009 
(0.29) 
970 --- -1.067*** 
(0.27) 
970 --- 0.059*** 
(0.04) 
970 --- 
Tier 2/rwa 0.389*** 
(0.40) 
965 --- -0.066 
(0.92) 
965 --- -0.062*** 
(0.06) 
965 --- 
Total capital/rwa 0.211*** 
(0.18) 
1416 --- -0.659*** 
(0.21) 
1416 --- 0.05*** 
(0.03) 
1416 --- 
Tier 1/ta 0.111 958 --- -1.052*** 958 --- 0.113*** 958 --- 
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                                                                                                                                                                                        (Continued)                
Notes: See Appendix A.1 for the variables’ definitions. In Panel A, we employ a bootstrapped model with heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors. In Panel B, we use a fixed-effect model. In Panel C, we use a random-effect model. In Panel D, we 
use a Fama–McBeth estimation technique. The dependent variables are the bank loan loss reserves to gross loans (LLRGLP), 
the bank cost to income ratio (CIRP) and the bank earnings to assets (EARTAP). Standard errors are clustered at the bank level 
and reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.  
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
(0.75) (1.03) (0.09) 
Tier 2/ta 0.886*** 
(0.97) 
946 --- -0.202 
(1.32) 
946 --- -0.102 
(0.26) 
946 --- 
Total capital/ta 0.462*** 
(0.13) 
1120 --- -0.738*** 
(0.48) 
1120 --- 0.067** 
(0.03) 
1120 --- 
Common equity/ta 0.212*** 
(0.24) 
1877 --- -0.809*** 
(0.40) 
1877 --- 0.112*** 
(0.04) 
1877 --- 
Tangible equity/ta 0.22*** 
(0.23) 
1877 --- -0.836*** 
(0.37) 
1877 --- 0.112*** 
(0.03) 
1877 --- 
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Appendix A 
A.1.Variable definitions and data sources  
Variable Definition Data Sources 
Dependent variables   
1. Risk model 
Loan loss/gross loans (LLRGLP) Bank reserves for loan loss divided by gross loans times 100. Bankscope 
Non-performing loans/gross loans 
(NPLGLP) 
Bank non-performing loans divided by gross loans times 100. Bankscope 
2. Efficiency model 
Cost to income (CIRP) The share of bank costs to bank income before provisions times 100. Bankscope 
Net interest margin (NIMP) Bank interest income minus bank interest expenses as a percentage of earning 
assets. 
Bankscope 
3. Profitability model   
Earnings/ta (EARTAP) Bank interest income minus bank interest expenses as a percentage of total 
assets. 
Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Earnings/gross loans (EARGLP) Bank interest income minus bank interest expenses as a percentage of gross 
loans. 
Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Independent variables  
1. Capital requirements  
Tier 1/rwa This measure of capital adequacy measures Tier 1 capital divided by risk-
weighted assets computed under the Basel rules. Banks must maintain 
minimum Tier 1 capital of at least 4%. 
Bankscope  
Tier 2/rwa This measure of capital adequacy measures Tier 2 capital divided by risk-
weighted assets computed under the Basel rules.  
Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Total capital/rwa This ratio is the capital adequacy ratio. It is the sum of bank Tier 1 plus Tier 
2 capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets. This ratio must be 
maintained at a level of at least 8% under the Basel II rules.  
Bankscope  
Tier 1/ta This measure of capital adequacy measures Tier 1 capital divided by total 
assets.  
Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Tier 2/ta This measure of capital adequacy measures Tier 2 capital divided by total 
assets. 
Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Total capital/ta This measure is bank Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital divided by total assets. Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Common equity/ta Bank common equity includes common shares and premium, retained 
earnings, reserves for general banking risks and statutory reserves divided by 
total assets. 
Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Tangible equity/ta Bank tangible equity divided by total assets. This measure removes goodwill 
and any other intangible assets from both the equity and the asset side of the 
bank balance sheet. 
Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope  
2. Bank control variables 
Net loans/ta The share of net loans as a percentage of bank total assets. Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Growth assets The current year growth of bank total assets compared with the previous 
year’s total assets. 
Bankscope 
Income diversity 1–[(net interest income–other operating income)/(operating income)]. 
Higher values mean more diversified activities. 
Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Size  The natural logarithm of total assets. Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
3. Country control variables 
World Governance Index The World Governance Index includes six governance dimensions: (1) voice 
and accountability, (2) political stability and absence of violence, (3) 
government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law and (6) 
control of corruption.  
Kaufmann et al. 
(2006); World Bank 
(2013) 
Arab Spring (AS_1) A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for countries that face 
revolutions and political changes and 0 otherwise. 
Ghosh (2015)  
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